Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
8-11-2022 9:30 AM

Revisiting Cognitive Dissonance: A Closer Look at the Core
Assumptions of a Classic Theory
Mikayla V. Colthirst-Reid, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Heerey, Erin A., The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Science degree in
Psychology
© Mikayla V. Colthirst-Reid 2022

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Social Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Colthirst-Reid, Mikayla V., "Revisiting Cognitive Dissonance: A Closer Look at the Core Assumptions of a
Classic Theory" (2022). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 8695.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/8695

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
Cognitive dissonance is a well-established and highly cited psychological theory. However,
many of its basic assumptions have come under recent criticism concerning methodological
design, variable manipulation, and measurement of dissonance as a unique psychological
phenomenon distinct from general negative affect. A within-subjects design compared
measures of dissonance-related affect at baseline to the same affect measures across varying
magnitudes of belief-behaviour inconsistency via a counter-attitudinal task. The study also
measured belief change in response to dissonance conditions and explored relationships
between dissonance experience and individual difference variables (extraversion, religiosity,
and political orientation). Results did not support an increase of dissonance relative to
baseline, nor change in belief following dissonance induction. Additionally, dissonance was
unrelated to religiosity and extraversion, but associated negatively with conservative political
orientation. Findings suggest alternative motivations other than psychological discomfort or
negative affect for belief change in classic dissonance paradigms.

Keywords
Cognitive Dissonance, Belief Change, Social Psychology, Belief-Behaviour Inconsistency,
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Summary for Lay Audience
Cognitive dissonance describes a motivational process where, upon becoming aware of an
inconsistency between attitudes or an attitude and behaviour, an individual experiences
psychological discomfort and is compelled to devise a strategy to reduce or eliminate the
discomfort. This theory lies at the heart of research on attitude and behaviour change and has
been a cornerstone of social psychology for over six decades. Although numerous studies
have used the theory to promote positive behaviour, develop effective health interventions,
and form predictions on why and when attitudes and behaviours may change, some of the
basic assumptions have been taken for granted. This study aimed to address recent criticisms
of the theory in order to strengthen the body of work and contribute to a more theoretically
sound basis upon which to apply cognitive dissonance in real-world settings.
Specifically, this work sought to investigate the assumptions that the mere presence of a
belief-behaviour inconsistency triggers an onset of cognitive dissonance, that this dissonance
would increase as the intensity of the inconsistency increases, and that belief change would
be associated with the experience of cognitive dissonance. Participants in the study wrote
persuasive paragraphs that varied in their consistency with their prior beliefs on several
topics. Dissonance-related emotions were measured following paragraphs written that
strongly contradicted their prior beliefs, strongly aligned with their prior beliefs, and that
neither explicitly aligned nor contradicted their beliefs. Personality, religiosity, and political
orientation were investigated as possible factors that may have affected dissonance
experience.
Contrary to the claims made by previous research, I found no evidence for belief-behaviour
inconsistency as a trigger for dissonance-related feelings or belief change as an indicator that
dissonance had occurred. These findings contradict the assumptions regarding dissonance
onset and belief change in response to dissonance, suggesting further work is necessary to
clearly understand the dissonance process.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

The theory of Cognitive Dissonance claims that when a person recognizes a conflict
between some aspect of their beliefs/thoughts and their behaviour, they experience
unpleasant affect. To reduce this unpleasant feeling, they must change either their
behaviour or their belief thereby resolving the conflict (Festinger, 1957). Since Leon
Festinger completed the first major work on Cognitive Dissonance Theory in 1957, there
have been more than 300,000 papers published on this topic (Google Scholar). This idea
has become central to the study of attitudes, attitude/behaviour change and motivation,
amongst other ideas (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2019; Cooper, 2019; Vaidis & Bran, 2019).
As such, it is a cornerstone theory within social psychology, underpinning both basic and
applied research branches. However, scholars have begun to question the validity of this
work, due to the presence of several methodological oversights that frequently afflict
research in this field (e.g., Vaidis & Bran, 2019).
Because this theory is so central to social psychology, it is important to re-visit basic
work in the dissonance literature and address some of these methodological issues. These
issues include the presence of small sample sizes – often fewer than 50 participants
within a group (Priolo et. al, 2019; Freijy & Kothe, 2013). Small sample sizes are
problematic because they limit the degree to which results can generalize (Privitera,
2016), are more vulnerable to extreme values than larger samples (Asendorpf et al., 2016)
and can lead to the overestimation of group differences (Asendorpf et al., 2016). To
enhance generalizability, sample sizes and sample diversity should be improved.
A second issue in the literature is that almost without exception, cognitive dissonance has
been studied in a between-subjects rather than a within-subjects fashion, and very little of
this work describes strong double-blinding procedures in the data collection phase (Freijy
& Kothe, 2013). Recent evidence shows that experimenter demeanor, especially when an
experimenter has knowledge of both expected results and participant condition, can have
a significant effect on study outcomes (Doyen et al., 2012; Gilder & Heerey, 2018). In
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addition, between-subjects designs rarely allow for repeated measurement of the
dependent variable, which can reduce the reliability of measured results (Breakwell et. al,
2020).
Finally, the measurement of the cognitive dissonance state itself has not been wellstandardized. Though many studies have described theoretically what the cognitive
dissonance state should be like and have inferred this state from various adjacent
measures, the observation of real-time dissonance has not been prioritized. This has led to
standardized measures of various processes surrounding the dissonance event (e.g.,
inconsistency as establishing dissonance, attitude change as dissonance resolution
[McGrath, 2017; Vaidis & Bran, 2019]), but a considerable neglect in terms of describing
specific characteristics of dissonance experience beyond the original (and somewhat
vague) characterization as “psychological discomfort” (Vaidis & Bran, 2019).
The aim of the current research is to address these criticisms by re-thinking the design of
a common cognitive dissonance paradigm in which participants are asked to write a
persuasive essay promoting an idea with which they strongly disagree (i.e., a counterattitudinal task).

1.1

A Brief History of Cognitive Dissonance

In the 1950s, Leon Festinger developed the theory of cognitive dissonance to explain
what happens when individuals experience a conflict between their beliefs and
behaviours (or between two contradictory “cognitions” [Festinger, 1957]). The theory
claimed that such conflict led to a psychological state called “cognitive dissonance”. This
state was characterized by feelings of discomfort that people were motivated to resolve
by adjusting one of the conflicting elements (i.e., the belief or the behavior) to make it
consistent with the other. The process of reconciling the divergent cognitions and/or
behaviours served to eliminate both the conflict and the resulting negative psychological
experience (Festinger, 1957). Such conflict could, for example, take the form of having to
decide between two equally attractive (or unattractive) options (Brehm, 1956),
performing an action that conflicted with a participant’s own moral code or values
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(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), or having to reconcile a strong commitment to an idea in
the face of disconfirming/conflicting evidence (Festinger, 1956).
To test the main claims of the theory, many of the earliest cognitive dissonance
experiments asked individuals to perform counter-attitudinal tasks (e.g., Cooper et. al,
1978; Elliot & Devine, 1994; Cancino-Montencinos et. al, 2018). For example, in one
famous study (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), participants completed a boring task and
were then paid either $1 or $20 to lie to the next participant by telling them that the task
was interesting. The results of this study showed that participants changed their beliefs to
a greater degree after receiving a payment of $1 than after receiving $20. The researchers
concluded that the belief change occurred because of discomfort experienced when there
was no sufficient incentive for justifying behavior dissonant to participants’ beliefs. Thus,
when there is no other readily available way to reckon with belief/behaviour
inconsistency (e.g., by attributing dissonance behaviour to an enticing incentive), belief
change seemed to be the next most accessible strategy.
By the end of the 1950s, research on cognitive dissonance theory had broadly supported
the idea that when people are compensated handsomely for engaging in an attitudeinconsistent behaviour, they experience little discomfort because they can justify an
attitude-behaviour discrepancy by attributing their behaviour to the remuneration, thereby
divesting themselves of responsibility. However, when compensation is perceived to be
small, the feelings of discomfort that arise in the context of attitude-inconsistent
behaviour must be resolved by attitude change because the responsibility for the
behaviour rests with the self (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
In the years that followed, numerous studies attempted to corroborate and expand on
these initial findings, providing both support for the original work and opportunities to
refine various aspects of the theory, all the while relying heavily on belief change as a
standard outcome measure of both the occurrence and resolution of cognitive dissonance
(McGrath, 2017). Similarly, research has shown that participants subjected to
discomforting experiences (e.g., hazing) to gain access to an exclusive group or privilege
report greater liking of the outcome (e.g., group membership) than do those who receive
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the same outcome without the experience of discomfort (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959). In
addition, researchers have supported Festinger’s claim that dissonance operates as a
drive-like state (similar to hunger) citing evidence that its presence interferes with
performance on learning and memory tasks (e.g., Waterman & Katkin, 1967; Martinie et
al., 2010).
Over the next several decades, dissonance research flourished with thousands of articles
published across a variety of disciplines, both basic and applied. Ultimately, using
different research paradigms, experiments from a number of independent laboratories
seemed to demonstrate overwhelming support for the theory. These experiments showed
evidence that when faced with a belief-behaviour inconsistency, individuals will
experience dissonance and attempt some reduction strategy if two conditions are met: 1)
they feel like they freely chose the action, and 2) they attribute the discomfort to the
inconsistency (Zanna & Cooper, 1974).
However, despite numerous revisions and extensions of the theory, its main assumptions
have remained largely unchallenged. These are 1) that dissonance is a unique
psychological state that is induced by exposure to an inconsistency between two strongly
believed cognitions or to a belief-behaviour discrepancy, and 2) that dissonance reduction
occurs after experiencing an attitudinal or behavioural change that serves to reduce the
inconsistency (Festinger, 1957).
Unfortunately, however, research thus far has shown few examples of the presence of this
unique psychological state by using multiple measurements to differentiate it from
participants’ psychological state prior to the dissonance-causing intervention (CancinoMontecinos et al., 2018; Martinie et. al, 2013). In addition, although there has been some
attempt to characterize elements of the dissonance state (e.g., physiological arousal,
negative affect; Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Proulx et al., 2012), it remains vaguely
characterized as the experience of psychological discomfort (Vaidis & Bran, 2019).
Without a precise understanding and operationalization of the emotional experiences that
comprise the state of cognitive dissonance, it is difficult to make clear predictions for
how it will affect behaviour both inside and beyond the laboratory.
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1.2

Flaws in the Literature

In the wake of the replication crisis, researchers are calling for a more thorough revision
of many established theories—cognitive dissonance being no exception. Though several
flaws have been highlighted recently in the literature (e.g., Vaidis & Bran, 2019), the
current study aims to address three key issues in cognitive dissonance research:
methodology, measurement, and manipulation.

1.2.1

Issues in Research Methodology

The first major limitation of the current dissonance literature relates to research design
concerns. First, much of the research in this field relies upon between-subjects research
designs in which participants are randomly assigned to either a condition that induces
dissonance or a condition that does not (See Freijy & Kothe, 2013 and Priolo et. al, 2019
for meta-analysis and review). Often this research fails to report either the presence of
double-blind designs or the methods by which any double blinding occurred (e.g., Cooper
& Feldman, 2020; Voisin & Fointiat, 2013). This is problematic because evidence
suggests that researcher knowledge can inadvertently influence participants’ experience
of the research design as well as the data they produce (Gilder & Heerey, 2018).
Another obvious problem with between-subjects designs is that individual differences in
responses to the manipulation are largely unaccounted for, although they likely exist.
This can be partially remedied in the analysis stage by controlling for certain variables
(but see counter argument by Lakens, 2013). Correlations between dissonance experience
and other relevant individual difference variables can also be examined to help
researchers understand such issues. However, given the relatively small sample sizes in
the current literature, these are unsatisfactory solutions.
Lastly, to our knowledge, few studies in the field of dissonance research document an
increase from baseline in the experience of cognitive dissonance in the high-dissonance
condition. That is, although differences in cognitive dissonance across task conditions are
robust (e.g., Freijy & Kothe, 2013; Priolo et. al, 2019), it is largely unknown how much
the high-dissonance condition differs from baseline. This seems to be a critical element of
the theory of cognitive dissonance. If the dissonance-eliciting condition does not truly
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increase dissonance-related affect, what is responsible for the attitude change? Without
attempting to measure changes in this variable over time, it is difficult to know whether
the high-dissonance condition increases dissonance, the low-dissonance condition
decreases it or both conditions change from baseline. This is a central, and yet
unmeasured assumption in the present body of research. The only way to address it is to
ensure that participants complete a baseline measurement of affective experience that
includes cognitive dissonance experience so that changes in experience can be compared
with this baseline condition.

1.2.2

Measurement of the Experience of Cognitive Dissonance

Numerous studies claim to have empirically supported the existence of cognitive
dissonance as a psychological phenomenon. However, what many of these studies
actually report is the presence of a dissonance reduction strategy (e.g., a change in
attitude [McGrath, 2017]), by which the assumption is made that the experience of
cognitive dissonance has also occurred (Festinger, 1957). This practice is problematic, as
there are many possible causes for attitude change (and other dissonance reduction
strategies) in any given context. Additionally, measuring outcome variables like
dissonance reduction does not reveal anything about the nature of dissonance state itself
(e.g., its specific magnitude or affective experience) except that it has, in theory,
motivated the measured outcome. When researchers rely on external cues to infer states
of dissonance and the resolution thereof, there is a loss of information about dissonance
as a unique construct, as well as dissonance as a psychological state that can be measured
and potentially used as a tool to improve both individual and social behaviour (e.g.,
Chiou, 2006; Freijy & Kothe, 2013; Stone et al., 1994).
In accord, several researchers have expressed the need for a standardized measure of
cognitive dissonance (Devine et. al, 1999; Vaidis & Bran, 2019). Without standardization
of both scales and implementation (i.e., standardized instructions, scoring), the
measurement and description of cognitive dissonance as a state becomes imprecise, thus
obfuscating the interpretation of data on the induction, reduction, effects, and practical
implications of its experience (Vaidis & Bran, 2019). Basic physiological arousal was a
popular dissonance measure for some time (Elliot & Devine, 1994), but received the
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criticism that it was inadequate as part of the original theory as expressed by Festinger,
which explicitly described psychological discomfort as a main driver of dissonance
reduction (1957).
Elliot and Devine (1994) addressed this issue with the dissonance thermometer, a tool
they developed to measure the state of cognitive dissonance by assessing self-reported
affective experience (Devine et. al, 1999). As dissonance is often defined as
psychological discomfort, the dissonance thermometer appears to be a useful and logical
way to assess, via self-report, an individual’s subjective experience in response to a
theoretically dissonance-inducing situation. According to Elliot and Devine’s (1994)
research, three out of 24 affect items appear to be sensitive to the presence of a beliefbehaviour inconsistency via a counter-attitudinal task. These affect items
“uncomfortable”, “uneasy”, and “bothered”, emerged as a “dissonance index” over and
above other negative or positive affect items after performing the task and decreased after
attitude change, providing some of the first empirical evidence that cognitive dissonance
state is specifically characterized by discomfort-related emotions (as opposed to other
negative affect items such as guilt, anger, or shame [Elliot & Devine, 1994]). Elliot and
Devine (1994) used the dissonance affect items in tandem with attitude change to
examine the experience of psychological discomfort during dissonance induction as a
motivator of dissonance reduction via attitude change, in contrast to measures of physical
arousal that had received disproportionate attention in the prior literature (Elliot &
Devine, 1994).
The creation of the dissonance thermometer was a milestone in the dissonance literature,
creating a measure of the experience of dissonance that could be used as a consistent tool
for future studies. However, it should be noted that while the dissonance thermometer is
extremely useful for operationalizing and measuring the experience of cognitive
dissonance, it is not without limitations. In particular, explicit self-report measures of
affect require both accuracy and honest reporting from participants, both of which can be
promoted but not ensured (Martinie et al., 2013; Vaidis & Bran, 2019).
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1.2.3

Manipulation of Cognitive Dissonance

The third issue in dissonance research concerns the manipulated variable in much of the
literature. In many paradigms (including but not limited to those that require counterattitudinal behavior), participants are typically placed in one of two experimental
conditions: a condition thought to cause dissonance, and a condition thought not to do so
(though neutral conditions are occasionally used in addition [Freijy & Kothe, 2013;
Priolo et. al, 2019]).
Despite the idea that the manipulation of inconsistency between attitudes and behaviour
(or multiple attitudes) should be the central element of a research paradigm in this
domain, the dissonance literature is rife with studies where manipulation of this
inconsistency as the predictor variable is missing (e.g., van Veen et al, 2009). Instead, in
many paradigms, belief/behaviour inconsistency is held constant (e.g., both groups in a
study perform the same inconsistent counter-attitudinal task), but the incentive changes
($1 vs $20), the perception of choice changes (being explicitly told that they may refrain
from the task vs being told they must complete the task), or the source of discomfort
changes (being given [or not] a pill that is supposed to enhance arousal in the task so that
the interpretation of the discomfort may be attributed to something other than the
inconsistency [Vaidis & Bran, 2019]).
This is problematic for several reasons. The first is that failing to manipulate the
consistency between belief and behaviour may lead to erroneous conclusions (e.g., some
other aspect of the manipulation may cause the outcome). A key part of understanding
the nature of cognitive dissonance (e.g., its onset, development, subjective experience,
resolution, and broader implications) is understanding the specific circumstances under
which it occurs. Festinger’s original claims indicate that inconsistent cognitions are at the
heart of the dissonance process, so to have a wide body of literature about the theory in
which little research manipulates inconsistency as the variable of interest is concerning.
Without a basic manipulation of inconsistency, (e.g., inconsistency type, salience, and
magnitude) it is difficult to make conclusions about how and why dissonance occurs or
its effects because a clear and detailed description of the central theoretical dissonance
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trigger is absent. More research that specifically manipulates attitude-behaviour
discrepancy is needed. Moreover, a research design that examines the effects of such
discrepancy manipulations within a given participant would provide strong evidence for
testing how and why changes in dissonance experience motivate the outcome variable
(e.g., belief change).
Another reason that the lack of inconsistency manipulation is problematic, is that without
isolating inconsistency as a variable apart from all other moderating factors, it becomes
unclear as to how much unique variance in dissonance is accounted for by the
inconsistency. Having a standard practice for inconsistency measurement and
manipulation would allow for a better understanding of the role of other moderating
variables. For example, Joel Cooper’s New Look model of dissonance (2019)
summarizes these moderating variables as the “but onlys” (page 4). According to this
idea, dissonance consistently occurs when there is inconsistency between belief and
behaviour, but only if participants feel as though they have a great degree of choice; but
only if they are they are incentivized so poorly that they have no internal justifications for
their unethical actions; but only if they cannot attribute their physiological arousal (or
discomfort) to external sources (Cooper, 2019).
What the author’s assessment, and much of the research to date, fails to account for is the
but only concerning the key variable. That is, research typically assumes that if all the
moderating conditions are met, then dissonance occurs. However, to document this idea
strongly, the experience of dissonance should scale with the degree of belief-behaviour
inconsistency. Assessing how changes in the level of inconsistency affect dissonance
experience is an important step in understanding the dissonance process and should be
undertaken. Without this, results concerning any other moderating variable may very well
be meaningless.
In addition to the issues above, the current literature reports very little concerning
individual differences that may affect how cognitive dissonance emerges across
conditions, though there have been studies that describe possible cultural factors that may
explain variation in dissonance at the group level (Hoshino-Browne, 2012; Hoshino-
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Browne et al., 2005). However, it is important, especially in the context of individual
intervention strategies involving dissonance, that factors relating to personality and
worldview (e.g., religiosity and political orientation) are considered— factors that may
vary across populations (Saucier et al., 2015). For example, previous studies have used
the HEXACO-60 to assess personality traits and proneness to dissonance-related affect
such as guilt and shame (Ashton et al., 2014). Previous literature has also suggested that
cognitive dissonance effects may be reduced in individuals high in extraversion in
counter-attitudinal dissonance paradigms (Matz et al., 2008).

1.3

Current Research

The current study aimed to address each of these issues first by using a repeatedmeasures design in which affective experience is measured (including positive affect,
negative affect, and the experience of cognitive dissonance) at baseline and again at each
of three belief-behaviour discrepancy conditions.
I used Elliot & Devine’s dissonance thermometer as a starting point, mitigating the
limitations of self-reported affect by using a sliding scale anchored at 0 and 100, which
allowed for more nuanced differences in affect measurements across conditions.
Additionally, these affect measures were also collected intermittently throughout the
course of the study, allowing for both a baseline (pre-manipulation) measure of affect,
and a within-subjects comparison of dissonance in response to varying conditions. To
reduce demand characteristics related to reporting negative affect (Nichols & Maner,
2008), the study was framed as an investigation of the effect of writing on emotions and
explicitly informed participants that affect would be measured several times during the
study (i.e., each time they wrote a paragraph). To disguise the presence of the dissonance
thermometer, the specific dissonance items were randomly embedded within a larger
affect measure (the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; Watson et. al, 1988), thereby
reducing the likelihood that participants would guess what was being assessed. Including
the additional affect items also provided insight into how negative and positive affect
change directionally relative to one another in response to the varying conditions.
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Second, I addressed the manipulation issue by using one dimension of inconsistency—
magnitude—as the independent variable and adjusting this magnitude within participants
(task conditions include high belief-behaviour inconsistency, medium belief-behaviour
inconsistency, and low belief-behaviour inconsistency). I first measured participants’
beliefs about a number of topics, then asked them to write persuasive paragraphs about
one they disbelieve strongly (high inconsistency), one they believe strongly (low
inconsistency) and one for which they hold no strong opinion (medium inconsistency).
Because this study was fully computer controlled, these topics could be calibrated for
each participant based on their own specific beliefs. The computer presented the
statements in random order to minimize order effects. This procedure allowed me to
determine how the dissonance experience changes as the degree of inconsistency changes
and how it relates to belief or attitude change. By doing this, I could then verify (or fail to
verify) the claim that dissonance is sensitive to inconsistencies of varying magnitude
while simultaneously gathering information about a possible critical threshold for which
dissonance either begins or ceases to occur (or increase).
Finally, I recruited a large sample of participants to attempt to address issues related to
small sample sizes. Together, this work allowed me to examine the experience of
cognitive dissonance while controlling for several confounding variables in the literature.
The following specific hypotheses are examined:
1) Hypothesis 1:
a. Consistent with the literature, the experience of cognitive dissonance will
decline across conditions as the magnitude or intensity of the
inconsistency declines.
b. Consistent with the literature, participants will experience strong cognitive
dissonance when in the high inconsistency condition (i.e., when asked to
write a counter-attitudinal argument) that represents an increase in
cognitive dissonance experience relative to a baseline measure.
2) Hypothesis 2:
a. Consistent with the literature, belief change will decline across conditions
as dissonance experience declines. Specifically, there will be less belief
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change in the lowest belief-behaviour inconsistency condition, relative to
the high belief-behaviour inconsistency condition.
b. Consistent with the literature, belief change will be positively associated
with dissonance experience, such that a greater magnitude of dissonance
experience in any given condition will be correlated with greater
magnitude of belief change.
3) Hypothesis 3: Individual differences in cognitive dissonance experience will
emerge, such that extraversion, along with conservative religious and political
beliefs will be associated with less dissonance.
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Chapter 2

2

Methods

All research was conducted with approval from the Western University Non-Medical
Research Ethics Board (see Appendix A for certificate of approval).

2.1

Participants

Two hundred and ninety-one psychology students were recruited from an undergraduate
research participation pool for a study of the “effects of persuasive writing on mood”. An
a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) to test the
difference between three measures of the dependent variable using an analysis of
variance, small effect size (f = .10), an alpha of .05 (Priolo et. al, 2019). Although, results
showed that a total sample of n = 259 was required to achieve a power of .95, I
oversampled in anticipation of deleting incomplete or unusable data. Because of the
nature of the writing requirement and the fact that the study took place online in an
unsupervised manner, I anticipated the loss of approximately 50 to 75 participants during
the study due to attrition, inattentiveness and/or failure to follow task instructions.
Participants received partial course credit for their time.
Before analyzing the data, I excluded participants who had more than 20% missing data
(N= 5). The remaining 286 participants had an average of 1.1% missing data (SD =
2.6%). Additionally, participants who failed two or more attention checks (N=4) or failed
to follow task instructions in writing the paragraphs (i.e., they wrote about why the idea
was false and not true as instructed or pasted in random text from elsewhere; N=42) were
excluded. The final sample included 240 participants with complete and verified data. Of
these, 71% identified as female, 20% as male, and 9% chose not to report. Participants
ranged in age from 17 to 40 years of age (mean = 18.20, SD = 1.71).

2.2

Procedure

The experiment was conducted entirely online using the Qualtrics survey platform
(www.qualtrics.com). It began with a brief demographic questionnaire, including several
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items assessing religiosity and political orientation, as previous literature has suggested
that both factors may be associated with the experience of cognitive dissonance (Burns,
2006; Forstmann & Sagioglou, 2020).
To assess religiosity, I adapted questions from the most recent (2018) version of the
Canadian General Social Survey – Caregiving and Care Receiving (GSS). These
questions were intended to provide a general assessment of religiosity as measured by
personal religious affiliation, personal importance of religious or spiritual beliefs
(measured on a 5-point scale from “not at all important” to “extremely important), and
frequency of participation in meetings/services and/or practices associated with religious
or spiritual beliefs (measured on a 5-point scale from “Not at all” to “at least once per
week”). Cronbach’s Alpha showed good reliability for the religiosity measure (3 items; 
= .88). I assessed political orientation using a 7-point single-item measure (“To what
extent do you identify as liberal or conservative on both social and economic issues?”)
that ranged from “Very liberal” to “Very Conservative” (see White et al., 2020).
To start the study, audio-recorded task instructions introduced the procedure and
informed participants that they would be asked to write several short persuasive
paragraphs on psychology-related ideas, followed by a mood inventory and a short
questionnaire after each. Participants then completed a baseline measure of mood. I
measured mood (and cognitive dissonance) using an adapted version of the Positive and
Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS is a 20item self-report measure of positive and negative affect intended to provide brief,
reliable, and independent measures of positive and negative mood (Crawford & Henry,
2004). Participants completed the items in random order on a 100-point Visual Analog
Scale anchored with “not at all” and “extremely” by adjusting a slide bar with their
mouse. In the present sample, Cronbach’s Alpha showed good reliability for both scales
(PA:  = .88; NA:  = .90). Importantly, the presence of the PANAS allowed me to
conceal the measurement of cognitive dissonance.
To measure dissonance experience, I included six additional items taken from the
dissonance thermometer (Devine et. al, 1999). Three of the six items corresponded
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specifically to dissonance related affect (“uneasy”, “bothered”, “uncomfortable”;  = .82;
Elliot & Devine, 1994) and the remaining three items were positive affect items
(“energetic”, “optimistic”, “happy”). These positive items were included to ensure an
equal number of positive and negative affect items to avoid response bias. Thus, the
measure had a total of 26 items, 13 assessing positive affect and 13 assessing negative
affect. The items were re-randomized each time participants completed this measure. The
modified affect measure allowed the repeated assessment of cognitive dissonance without
alerting participants to the true purpose of the measure (for similar procedures, see
Harmon Jones, 2000).
After the initial mood measure, participants rated how much they believed each of a
series of psychology statements (e.g., “Subliminal messages can be used to persuade
others to purchase products.”, “Most people use only 10% of their brains.”; Gaze, 2014).
Although each of the statements is a commonly believed psychology-related myth,
participants were not informed of this at the start of the study. They made their belief
ratings on a 7-point scale from “Definitely False” to “Definitely True”, with the midpoint labeled “No strong belief either way”.
After rating the items, participants completed the 60-item self-report HEXACO Revised
Personality Inventory (HEXACO-60; Lee & Ashton, 2009, 2018) to both explore the
relationships between the experience of cognitive dissonance and personality factors
(e.g., Al Otaibi, 2012), and to provide an interim task between the belief ratings and the
experimental manipulation.
The HEXACO assumes a 6-factor personality structure including extraversion (“I prefer
jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone.”),
agreeableness (“I tend to be lenient in judging other people.”), openness to experience
(“People have often told me that I have a good imagination.”), emotionality (“I
sometimes can’t help worrying about little things.”), conscientiousness (“I always try to
be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time.”), and honesty/humility (“I
wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would
succeed.”). Participants indicated their level of agreement with each statement on a five-
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point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. Three attention
check items were inserted at random points within the HEXACO and participants
completed the items in random order. In the present sample, Cronbach’s alphas for the
HEXACO subscales ranged from .74 to .79.
Following the personality inventory, participants wrote a short essay about each of three
psychology-related ideas that they had previously rated. Unbeknownst to participants, the
computer selected these topics based on their own ratings of the degree to which they
believed the items. Using purpose-written JavaScript code embedded in the survey, the
computer selected their most strongly believed myth, the most strongly disbelieved myth,
and a myth that they rated as being closest to the center of the belief scale (i.e., neither
strongly believed nor strongly disbelieved). When there were multiple items that had
target ratings (e.g., strongly disbelieve), the computer selected one at random from
amongst the set.
Participants were then asked to spend about 10 minutes writing a paragraph intended “to
persuade another student that the statement is true”. Participants typed their paragraphs
directly into a text box on the screen. After 6 minutes, a button on the screen appeared
allowing them to advance to the next page. There was no “upper” limit to the time they
could spend on the paragraph. On average, participants spent 8.76 minutes (SD=3.57
minutes) on each paragraph. Participants wrote about the items in random order.
After each paragraph, they responded to two items answered on a 5-point scale from
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”: “I was familiar with the idea I just wrote about
prior to completing the writing exercise” and “I believe that the idea I just wrote about is
psychological fact”. They also completed the mood measure (see above), followed by a
responding to the question “Were you satisfied with the paragraph you wrote on this
topic?” on a 5-point scale from “Not at all” to “Extremely”.
Following the final paragraph and ratings, the computer informed participants that all of
the statements they had written about were false. Participants were then debriefed using a
“funnel style” debriefing (Bargh et al., 1996) wherein they answered a series of openended and partially open-ended probing questions that asked, with increasing detail,
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about the extent to which participants understood the purpose of the study (e.g., “What
did you think the purpose of the study was”, “Did you notice anything about the
psychology information you were asked to rate?”). Participants also answered questions
about the degree to which they understood that the purpose of the study was to examine
cognitive dissonance, and how surprised they would be to learn that all the items they
wrote about were false (measured on a 5-point scale from “Not at all surprised” to
“Extremely surprised”), and how much they still believed each of their three chosen
statements to be true after learning that each item they wrote about was false (measured
on a 100-point Visual Analog Scale anchored with “not at all” and “extremely”; for a full
list of items, questionnaires, and task instructions, see [OSF]).
Participants were then fully debriefed and given a final opportunity to withdraw consent
before submitting their data.

2.3

Data Analysis Methods

Figure 1 shows
participants’ average
belief in each paragraph
topic as measured before
the writing task. Notably,
it shows that the
algorithm used to select
writing topics for each of
the belief-behaviour
inconsistency conditions
functioned as intended,
generating excellent
separation of reported
belief levels across the
conditions. This is an
important pre-condition

Figure 1. Average pre-writing belief scores. Participants generally
reported strongly believing the topic in the low belief-behaviour
inconsistency condition, and strongly disbelieving the high beliefbehaviour inconsistency condition. Error bars show the 95% CI.
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for any hypothesis testing in this task protocol, as it shows that any effects (or lack
thereof) associated with the differences between writing conditions cannot be explained
by lack of variance (e.g., floor or ceiling effects) in participants’ belief ratings across the
conditions.

Hypothesis 1A
The first hypothesis (H1A) concerns validation of early cognitive dissonance studies,
where dissonance, characterized as psychological discomfort, is expected to be present in
a high-inconsistency condition, and negligible (if not, absent) in a low-inconsistency
condition. I had predicted a significant linear relationship across the belief-behaviour
inconsistency conditions in terms of how much discomfort participants would report
experiencing, with significantly less dissonance in the low belief-behaviour inconsistency
condition than in the high belief-behaviour inconsistency condition. To test this
hypothesis, I conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance using belief-behaviour
inconsistency condition (low, medium, and high) as the within-participants independent
variable. I computed an average “cognitive dissonance” score for each participant within
each condition using the three items from Elliot and Devine’s dissonance thermometer
(1994), measured just after writing the relevant paragraph. These scores became the
dependent variables in this analysis. A significant omnibus test triggered a set of post-hoc
comparisons to examine differences across the conditions. These were Bonferronicorrected to control experiment-wise Type I error.

Hypothesis 1B
One significant but untested assumption in the cognitive dissonance literature is that
when participants experience a high level of belief-behaviour inconsistency, the
experience of cognitive dissonance increases. This suggests that in the high beliefbehaviour inconsistency condition, participants should experience more dissonance than
they do before any manipulation. Conversely, one might imagine that the low beliefbehaviour inconsistency condition might generate less cognitive dissonance relative to
baseline due to the high levels of belief-behaviour coherence. H1B examined this
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assumption. To conduct this analysis, I computed a baseline-centered score for each
participant in each condition by subtracting the baseline dissonance score from the
dissonance score for each of the high, medium, and low inconsistency conditions. Based
on this procedure, positive values indicate an increase in cognitive dissonance experience
relative to baseline and negative values indicate a decrease. I then performed a set of one
sample t-tests (against a test-value of 0) for each of the conditions.

Hypothesis 2
My second hypothesis (H2A) concerned the verification of another element of the
original dissonance theory—the idea that the experience of cognitive dissonance
motivates an individual to reduce their discomfort in the face of belief-behaviour
inconsistency by, in this case, attitude change (Festinger, 1957). Given that attitude
change is a widely used measure of dissonance—indeed, the fact that it has occurred is
often taken as evidence for the presence of dissonance (e.g., Breithaupt et. al, 2020;
Harmon-Jones, 2000)—I corroborated this idea by comparing participants’ level of belief
in each statement immediately after writing their persuasive paragraphs to their reported
belief at the start of the study.
To quantify this change, I computed the number of scale points participants changed from
the anchor point of that belief condition. For example, the high inconsistency condition
had an anchor point of -3 at the start of the task. That became the anchor for this
condition and if a participant increased their belief by 1 scale point, this was coded as 1.
Participants who increased their belief in the item by 2 scale points received a score of 2,
etc. (see Elliot & Devine, 1994). The other conditions were coded similarly, with belief
change quantified as the absolute value of the scale change. I used the absolute value as
my change metric because in the low belief-behaviour inconsistency condition, the
anchor point was 3 (the highest scale rating). In this case, a participant who rated this
topic as a 3, and reported a one-scale-point change in belief after writing their paragraph
showed a decrease in the strength of their belief. Thus, I calculated the absolute value of
each participants’ level of change in belief from the start of the study to just after they
wrote the relevant paragraph.
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Once these change scores were computed, I compared belief change across conditions
using a repeated measures analysis of variance with belief-behaviour inconsistency
condition as the independent variable. I predicted that there would be more belief change
in the high-inconsistency condition than either the medium or low conditions, given that
the highest level of inconsistency should trigger the highest amounts of dissonancerelated affect, and consequently belief change. As above, a significant main effect was
followed with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests.
In addition, I predicted that the experience of cognitive dissonance would be positively
correlated with belief change (H2B). To test this idea, I conducted a correlational analysis
to quantify the expectation that greater dissonance should be associated with more belief
change.

Hypothesis 3
The final hypothesis was designed to extend this work to understand how several
individual-difference variables related to cognitive dissonance experience. I tested three
predictions, along with conducting several exploratory analyses. Specifically, I predicted
that dissonance experience would relate to religiosity (higher religiosity scores would be
associated with less dissonance), political orientation (higher scores on political
orientation, indicative of more conservative political beliefs, would be associated with
less dissonance), and extraversion (consistent with previous findings [Al Otaibi, 2012;
Matz et. al, 2008], higher extraversion scores would be associated with less dissonance).
To test these ideas, I correlated cognitive dissonance experience and the belief change
measure in the high belief-behaviour inconsistency condition with the relevant individual
difference variables. I selected only this condition for these analyses because this
condition is theoretically the most dissonance-provoking, meaning it is likely to generate
the strongest effects.
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Chapter 3

3

Results

3.1
Hypothesis 1A: Cognitive Dissonance Experience
Across Conditions
As predicted, a repeated measures ANOVA with belief-behaviour inconsistency (low,
medium, high) as the independent variable and self-reported cognitive dissonance
experience as the dependent variable showed that participants experienced different
amounts of dissonance affect across conditions, F(1.936, 236) = 25.537, p < .001; n2p =
.098. Because the assumption of
sphericity is violated, ( = .97),
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected
results are reported. Bonferronicorrected post-hoc tests showed
that participants experienced
significantly more cognitive
dissonance in the high beliefbehaviour inconsistency condition
(M = 37.88, SD = 24.02 relative
to the low (M = 28.89, SD =
22.77), but not the medium
condition (M = 35.09, SD =
23.24). Likewise, participants
reported greater dissonance

Figure 2 Cognitive dissonance experience across

experience in the medium as

conditions. White dots show the median values for

compared to the low belief-

dissonance affect items and central boxes show inter-

behaviour inconsistency

quartile range. The whiskers show the minimum and

condition. Figure 2 shows these

maximum values in the distributions. Mean differences in

results. Thus, the present results,

cognitive dissonance between high/low and medium/low

which show reductions in

were greater than the difference between high/medium.
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cognitive dissonance across task conditions, are consistent with the previously reported
literature (Cooper, 2019; Vaidis & Bran, 2019).

3.2
Hypothesis
1B: Cognitive
Dissonance –
Inconsistency
Conditions vs.
Baseline
The experience of cognitive
dissonance is not only expected
to be higher in a high beliefbehaviour inconsistency
condition (compared to medium
or low), but also be enhanced
under this manipulation relative
to a baseline measure. That is,
according to much of the
literature, participants are
expected to experience an
increase in cognitive dissonance
in the high belief-behaviour
inconsistency condition. Thus,
the difference between
dissonance experience in the
high-inconsistency condition
and baseline dissonance

Figure 3. Cognitive Dissonance Experience Comparisons to
Baseline. White dots show the medians for difference between
cognitive dissonance and baseline across conditions. Central
boxes show inter-quartile range and whiskers show the
minimum and maximum differences from baseline. Baselinecentred mean comparisons show no significant difference in
cognitive dissonance experience between baseline and the high
inconsistency condition. Comparisons also show a decrease in
cognitive dissonance between baseline and the low
inconsistency condition.

experience should be greater than 0. I also tested dissonance scores (relative to baseline)
in the other conditions, with the prediction that the low-inconsistency condition might
lead to reduced dissonance experience, relative to baseline. Surprisingly, a series of one
sample Wilcoxon signed-rank t-tests (against a test value of 0) on the baseline centered
data revealed that although cognitive dissonance experience decreased relative to baseline
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in the low-inconsistency condition (M = -6.90, SD = 18.64) there was no increase from
baseline in the high-inconsistency condition (M = 2.06, .SD = 22.01). In the medium
condition I found that dissonance experience was also similar to baseline (M = -.75, .SD
= 21.35). Thus, contrary to widely accepted assumptions based on Festinger’s original
work (1957), participants did not report heightened cognitive dissonance in the highinconsistency condition. Instead, they reported significantly less cognitive dissonance
experience in the low-inconsistency condition (Figure 3).
I have already shown (see Figure 1) that this failure to find an increase in dissonance
experience in the high-inconsistency condition cannot be due to ceiling effects or range
restriction in participants’ belief ratings before the task. One alternate reason that
participants might have failed to experience dissonance is that they did not make a
serious attempt to write persuasively.
To test this idea, participants’ paragraphs were analyzed using the Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count (LIWC-22) software (Boyd et. al, 2022) which examines text passages for a
variety of linguistic features. Interestingly, LIWC analyses confirmed that the paragraphs
written were persuasive in nature, indicated by high scores for Clout (language of
leadership, status; Boyd et.al, 2022) and Analytical Content (metric of logical, formal
thinking; Boyd et. al, 2022). Participants also spent comparable amounts of time writing
each paragraph, regardless of inconsistency condition (see Table 1). However, post-hoc
Bonferroni corrections revealed significant differences in Clout and Analytic scores
between some conditions, but not others.
This suggests that while all paragraphs were written thoughtfully, participants appeared
to rely more on clout-related language to write persuasively when beliefs were minimally
or highly inconsistent with the paragraph (compared to a medium inconsistency), versus
using more analytical language to write persuasively when beliefs were minimally or
moderately inconsistent with the paragraph (compared to highly inconsistent). Exact
statistics for the LIWC analysis are reported in Table 1. Moreover, anecdotal evidence
from debriefing responses also confirmed that participants used considerable effort when
composing their persuasive paragraphs (e.g., “It was a lot more challenging than I was
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expecting … I found it very interesting to have to shift my beliefs as I was writing these
paragraphs … doing my best to prove these statements right even though I did not believe
them myself”). Thus, it is unlikely to be the case that participants’ lack of effort in the
task is the reason for this result.

Inconsistency

Time Spent

Word Count

Analytic

Condition

Writing (secs)

High

516.40 (199.10)

132.64a (49.63) 47.82a (25.96)

69.29a (26.66)

Medium

527.10 (207.00)

126.87b (43.04) 55.20b (26.51)

63.38b (27.71)

Low

534.02 (241.01)

141.49a (25.96) 54.10b (26.18)

67.03ab (24.93)

F(2, 239)

.768 (p=.457)

11.25 (p<.001)

3.23 (p=.037)

6.81 (p=.001)

Clout

Table 1 LIWC Analyses. Mean LIWC scores and writing duration in each of the beliefbehaviour inconsistency conditions for paragraphs written. ‘Analytic’ and ‘Clout’ scores
represent the percentage of words used in the paragraph that fall into each respective LIWC
category. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. The bottom rows of the table report the
results of RM-ANOVA comparisons across conditions. Means not sharing superscripts
within a variable column differ significantly at  =.05 as indicated by Bonferroni post-hoc
tests.
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3.3

Hypothesis 2: Belief Change

Hypothesis 2 sought to
confirm a commonly
used measure of
cognitive dissonance,
belief change.
Theoretically, belief
change is evidence of
both the occurrence of
dissonance and an
attempt to alleviate the
negative affect associated
with dissonance. Thus, in
the high-inconsistency
condition, I expected to
see greater change from
the originally reported
belief in the highinconsistency condition
than in the other
conditions. Furthermore,

Figure 4. Belief Change Across Conditions. Belief change is
quantified as the absolute number of scale points moved from the
original belief rating. White dots show the median belief change in
each condition. values for difference dissonance affect items and
central boxes show inter-quartile range. The whiskers show the
minimum and maximum values in the distributions (excluding two
outliers in the high-inconsistency condition).

I expected to see a
positive relationship between dissonance and belief change—i.e., the more dissonance
experienced, the greater change in belief to alleviate it.
When comparing belief change across conditions, a repeated measures analysis of
variance revealed that although there was a significant difference in belief change across
the conditions [F(1.834, 238) = 6.72, p= .002; n2p = .027], this difference emerged in an
unexpected way. Instead of the higher levels of dissonance experience in the high beliefbehaviour inconsistency condition ([M= .77, SD = 1.05]; see Hypothesis 1A, Figure 2,
above) triggering increased belief change, Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests showed
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that participants in this condition changed their beliefs significantly less than did those in
the medium inconsistency (M= 1.02, SD = .74) or low inconsistency conditions (M= 1.09,
SD = 1.22; Figure 4). Greenhouse-Geiser corrected results are reported due to violation of
the sphericity assumption ( = .92).
In addition, the results of a Spearman’s correlation analysis did not support the prediction
of a positive association between dissonance and belief change, instead showing a
negative correlation between dissonance and belief change in the high-inconsistency
condition (Table 2), even when controlling for familiarity with the topic a participant had
written about. Table 2 additionally shows the correlations for the other belief-behaviour
inconsistency conditions, both with and without the effects of topic familiarity partialled
out. Together, these results do not seem to support the idea that the experience of
cognitive dissonance motivates belief change in the way the literature has typically
assumed.
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Level of

Belief Change x

Belief Change x Dissonance

Inconsistency

Dissonance

(Controlling for topic
familiarity)

High

r(237) = -.15, (p = .020)
95% CI [-027, -0.02]

Medium

Low

r(237) = -.17 (p = .010)
95% CI [-0.29, -0.04]

r(237) = .13, (p = .050)

r(237) = .13 (p =.054)

95% CI [7.49e-5, 0.25]

95% CI [-0.01, 0.26]

r(237) = .14, (p = .027)

r(237) = .03 (p = .647)

95% CI [0.02, 0.27]

95% CI [-0.09, 0.14]

Table 2. Correlations and Partial Correlations Between Belief Change and Cognitive
Dissonance. Spearman’s rank correlation () is reported to show the relationship between
belief change and cognitive dissonance in each inconsistency condition. Partial correlations
were conditioned on ‘familiarity’.

3.4
Hypothesis 3: Individual Differences Related to
Cognitive Dissonance Experience
I had predicted that I would see a negative association between cognitive dissonance
experience in the high belief-behaviour inconsistency condition and, religiosity,
extraversion, and political orientation (in which higher scores indicate more conservative
political beliefs).
Contrary to predictions, I found no correlation between religiosity and dissonance
experience (r = -0.02, p = .374; Figure 5a). Specifically, dissonance experience was
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unrelated to religiosity. Similarly, results failed to confirm previous research (Al Otaibi,
2012; Matz et. al, 2008) suggesting a link between extraversion and dissonance
experience. Instead, these variables were not correlated in the present sample (r = -.07, p
= .129; Figure 5b).
Interestingly, there was a small but significant negative relationship between the
experience of cognitive dissonance and political orientation (r = -.197, p = .001; Figure
5c). Thus, as anticipated, those with more conservative political viewpoints experienced
less dissonance in when belief-behaviour inconsistency was high.

Figure 5. Correlations Between Cognitive Dissonance and Religiosity, Extraversion, and
Political Orientation. Pearson correlations show relationships between cognitive dissonance
experience and a) religiosity, b) extraversion and c) political orientation (higher values
indicate more conservative views).

3.4.1

Exploratory Analysis: Correlations with Personality Factors

I also explored the relationships between cognitive dissonance experience and other
personality factors (excluding extraversion), as measured on the HEXACO. In the high
belief-behaviour inconsistency condition, I found a significant relationship between
conscientiousness and cognitive dissonance experience (Table 3), such that those higher
in conscientiousness tended to experience less dissonance. However, it is important to
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note that these analyses were exploratory in nature and should be verified in new samples
prior to drawing strong conclusions.

HEXACO Factor

Spearman’s rho

CI 95%

Honesty-Humility

r(237) =- .05, p = .649

[-18, .08]

Emotionality

r(237) = .08, p = .224

[-.05, .20]

Agreeableness

r(237) = .05, p =.432

[-.18,.08]

Conscientiousness

r(237) = -.13, p = .047

[-.25, .00]

Openness to Experience

r(237) = .12, p = .073

[-.01, .24]

Table 3. Individual Differences in Cognitive Dissonance – Correlations with
HEXACO.

Spearman’s rank correlation () is reported to show the relationship

between cognitive dissonance and HEXACO personality factors (excluding
extraversion, reported above). Correlations above refer only to the high
inconsistency condition.

3.4.2

Exploratory Analysis: Verifying the Dissonance Thermometer

An ancillary idea in the cognitive dissonance literature is that the experience of cognitive
dissonance is poorly classified (e.g., Vaidis & Bran, 2019). Elliot and Devine’s
Dissonance Thermometer was developed to provide a standardized measure for cognitive
dissonance experience as a solution to this problem (Devine et. al, 1999).
In this study, I used the Dissonance Thermometer to collect repeated measurements of
dissonance experience, both associated with manipulation (i.e., immediately after writing
each paragraph) and not associated (baseline, end of study). This measure was embedded
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in a larger measure of both positive and negative affect (Watson et al., 1988). These data
therefore offer a unique opportunity to examine the Dissonance Thermometer items and
their relationship to other mood items.
Elliot and Devine (1994) proposed that the three items that make up the cognitive
dissonance thermometer were unique in terms of how participants reported experiencing
them in the context of a high belief-behaviour inconsistency condition. On that basis, I
anticipated that they might load onto a single “negative” factor (along with the rest of the
negative affect items) outside the context of the manipulation (e.g., at the baseline and
final measures) and that they might show a unique factor loading (i.e., load onto a new
factor) in the context of the high belief-behaviour inconsistency condition.
To test this idea and verify the dissonance thermometer, I first conducted a principal
components analysis with varimax rotation and a minimum factor loading of .4 to ensure
that the 26 items in the mood measure (PANAS plus additional items from Elliot and
Devine) used for the current study could reliably be separated into positive and negative
affect items. This analysis included mood measurements across all timepoints to ensure
the positive and negative factors emerged reliably without dissonance manipulation.
Three unique principal components emerged from the PCA (see Table 4). One
component comprised of all 13 negative affect items plus one positive affect item
(relaxed) that loaded negatively and cross-loaded with the second factor (accounting for
28.1% of the variance), the second component comprised of 11 of the positive affective
items (accounting for 18.9% of the variance), and the third comprised of four of the
positive affect items, two of which cross-loaded with the second component (accounting
for 8.6% of the variance).
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Factor 1
Uneasy

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

.82

Proud

.77

Uncomfortable .79

Strong

.75

Afraid

.79

Enthusiastic

.75

Scared

.78

Excited

.73

Upset

.77

Optimistic

.72

Distressed

.74

Inspired

.68

Nervous

.72

Active

.68

Bothered

.72

Content

.52

Ashamed

.71

Determined

.49

.56

Irritable

.70

Interested

.48

.52

Hostile

.68

Alert

.73

Guilty

.66

Attentive

.72

Jittery

.60

Relaxed

-.41

.43

Table 4. Principal Components Analysis – All Timepoints. Factor loadings based on a principal
components analysis using varimax rotation for 26 items used as the mood measure.
I then conducted an exploratory factor analysis to examine the extent to which the three
items identified in the dissonance thermometer emerged as unique from general negative
affect in this study. For the high-inconsistency condition (the condition in which the
dissonance index items should most likely emerge as a unique factor), 13 negative affect
items were factor analyzed using a principal-axis analysis with varimax rotation (see
Elliot & Devine, 1994). Using a minimum factor loading of .6, the analysis yielded a
single factor accounting for 51.5% of the variance (See Table 5). All three dissonance
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index items loaded onto this factor with nine of the remaining negative affect items,
suggesting general negative affect experienced during the high-inconsistency condition.
These factor loadings were subsequently compared to a similar analysis using the same
mood measurements taken at times that were unassociated with any manipulation.
Contrary to the high-inconsistency condition, I anticipated the presence of a general
negative affect factor during the non-manipulation conditions. Consistent with
expectations, the analysis of combined pre- and post-manipulation affect measures
yielded a single factor accounting for 48.5% of the variance (see Table 6).

Factor 1

Factor 1

Uneasy

.80

Uncomfortable

.81

Afraid

.76

Uneasy

.80

Scared

.76

Upset

.78

Uncomfortable

.76

Distressed

.77

Upset

.75

Scared

.76

Nervous

.73

Afraid

.75

Bothered

.70

Hostile

.72

Distressed

.69

Ashamed

.71

Ashamed

.65

Irritable

.69

Irritable

.65

Bothered

.67

Guilty

.62

Guilty

.65

Table 6. Exploratory Factor Analysis –

Nervous

.64

Pre/Post Manipulation Conditions. Factor

Table 5. Exploratory Factor Analysis –

loadings based on a principal-axis analysis
using varimax rotation for 13 negative affect
items used as the mood measure in pre- and
post-manipulation conditions only. Dissonance
items loaded onto a single factor with 8 other
negative affect items. Loadings <.6 excluded.

High-inconsistency Condition. Factor
loadings based on a principal-axis analysis
using varimax rotation for 13 negative affect
items used as the mood measure. Highinconsistency condition only. Dissonance
items loaded onto a single factor with 8 other
negative affect items. Loadings <.6 excluded.
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Chapter 4

4

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to address some of the recent criticisms against cognitive
dissonance and strengthen the theory using repeated measures of dissonance-related
affect in response to varying levels of belief/behaviour inconsistency. Additionally, I
aimed to extend the research on this topic, exploring individual differences in the
experience of cognitive dissonance based on relationships with personality, religiosity,
and political orientation.
This study used a procedure resembling the classic induced compliance paradigm popular
with dissonance researchers (e.g., Cooper et. al, 1978; Elliot & Devine, 1994; Harmon
Jones et. al, 2008). In this paradigm, participants typically write a counter-attitudinal
essay under one of two conditions—one designed to provoke the dissonance-related
affect and one thought to trigger no dissonance. However, the current study varied the
magnitude of the inconsistency to examine changes in dissonance experience across
inconsistency conditions using a within-participants design.

4.1

Dissonance Experience

Previous studies have supported the idea that participants experience more cognitive
dissonance is in high-dissonance-inducing conditions (Cooper, 2019). However, although
the data in this study did support Festinger’s original premise that cognitive dissonance
decreases as belief-behaviour inconsistency decreases, it did not show evidence that in
the dissonance evoking condition, participants experienced an increase in dissonance
experience relative to baseline. In fact, results appeared to show a decrease from baseline
in dissonance experience in a low-inconsistency condition, rather than the anticipated
increase from baseline in the high-inconsistency condition.
A common design in the dissonance literature involves a classic between-groups
configuration, where one group is subjected to a dissonance-inducing task, another is
subjected to a task not expected to trigger dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959;
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Stone et. al, 1994; Harmon-Jones, 2000). The effect is then confirmed by reporting
greater dissonance in the former group than the latter. While this does demonstrate
differences between the conditions, what it fails to show is how individuals respond to
varying levels of the dissonance trigger, and how those groups experience dissonance in
comparison to a baseline measure. This is an important assumption in the literature that,
to my knowledge, has not been well tested.
The current study offered a direct test of this assumption by manipulating the magnitude
of the dissonance experience within participants. Findings showed that dissonance
experience did indeed scale with the magnitude of the inconsistency. However, this study
also included a baseline condition, allowing for a test of the idea that the highinconsistency condition provokes dissonance. Here, results failed to confirm this key
assumption that is prevalent in the literature (Vaidis & Bran, 2019).
It should be noted that Elliot and Devine (1994) provided a baseline measure for
comparison of dissonance across conditions. However, this baseline was measured in a
separate group of participants who served as the “baseline” group. Given that these
participants were never asked to undergo an actual dissonance-evoking manipulation,
conclusions based on this procedure are limited. Moreover, the paper makes little
mention of any double-blinding procedures or standardization of task instructions that
would allow for a clean comparison between the baseline and manipulation groups.
In the present finding, the core premise of dissonance theory has been undermined. If the
simple presence of a belief/behaviour inconsistency does not invoke dissonance
immediately (as was previously assumed), then there is no clear process for how
dissonance is triggered. Furthermore, the decrease of dissonance below baseline levels
indicates a lack of knowledge about how it emerges in response to varying levels of
inconsistency, as previously inconsistency conditions have rarely been predictor variables
of interest (Vaidis & Bran, 2019).
Taken together, these results show that although participants experience changes in
dissonance the predicted direction across the inconsistency conditions, there is no
evidence that the condition theorized to cause dissonance does so. This begs the question
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of what causes the belief change in such conditions. If participants do not experience
increased dissonance in the dissonance-evoking condition, what would motivate
dissonance reduction? Importantly, in the present study, participants completed the
conditions in fully randomized order, meaning that simple order effects cannot be a factor
in these results.
While the results supported the prediction that dissonance differs across inconsistency
conditions, contrary to previous assumptions, I found no increase from baseline of
dissonance affect in the high inconsistency condition—a puzzling result given the
confidence with which this prediction has been stated as a basic premise of how
dissonance works.

4.2

Belief Change

According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, the experience of dissonance leads to a
process whereby participants are motivated to resolve experienced dissonance by
changing their beliefs (Festinger, 1957). Belief change is therefore a widely used
dependent measure in the literature. The present findings suggested that, contrary to
predictions, belief change was negatively correlated with dissonance in the highdissonance condition. That is, participants with greater dissonance experience showed
less belief change in this condition. The results also showed that the low-inconsistency
condition produced the greatest amount of belief change. This finding is in direct contrast
to both dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and prior results (Breithaupt et. al, 2020).
Although belief (or attitude) change remains a widely used dependent measure of
cognitive dissonance, it does not explicitly quantify dissonance itself. This is a
shortcoming in the literature. The presence of belief change may imply a dissonance
reduction process, but equally it may relate to other underlying phenomena. Indeed, to
assume that belief change is caused by a dissonance reduction without a direct test is
consistent with a logical fallacy known as “affirming the consequent” (James et. al,
1986). Still, belief change is often the indicator by which the occurrence, and resolution
of, dissonance is implied. Even in developing the dissonance thermometer, Elliot and
Devine (1994) relied on attitude change as the primary outcome variable with which to
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verify their affect measure. Such outcome measures have been reasonably criticized as
insufficient (Devine et. al, 1999; Vaidis & Bran, 2019), and to truly understand what lies
at the heart of the dissonance process, its experience needs to be more effectively
operationalized.
Measuring attitude change alone exposes conclusions drawn to questions concerning
variables that, unconsidered, limit the degree to which attitude change can be attributed to
dissonance alone. However, to conduct this study without also examining belief change
would be to omit a critical comparison. As belief change has thus far been a key metric
for measuring dissonance, I included it in this study to compare results with previous
studies. If belief change was a sound measure of dissonance, it should occur regardless
of, and even complement any additional measure. Belief change could then simply serve
as a supportive rather than the primary dissonance measure.
Analysis of belief change across conditions showed that belief change alone is unreliable
as a sole dissonance outcome variable. Contradicting previous findings (Festinger &
Carlsmith,1959), belief change did not occur as expected across conditions. Festinger’s
original theory (1957) would predict both i) increased belief change as inconsistency
(and, therefore, dissonance) increases and ii) a positive association between dissonance
experience and belief change in a high-inconsistency condition. Instead, results revealed
a higher belief change in the low-inconsistency condition compared with the highinconsistency consistency condition. Additionally, belief-change negatively correlated
with dissonance in the high-inconsistency condition. This result is consistent with some
previous literature (see Elliot and Devine 1994), but is one that nonetheless raises
questions concerning the process by which dissonance reduction occurs—does it occur
during the task, immediately following, or only after reporting affect? Possible answers to
this question should be explored in future work.
Concerning the measurement of dissonance-related affect, the dissonance thermometer is
one of the few available self-report measures that approximates the subjective dissonance
experience, subsequently allowing for measurement of how this experience responds to
varying conditions. Results from a factor analysis revealed clear differentiation of

37

negative and positive affect. However, items from the dissonance thermometer’s
discomfort index (uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered) did not emerge as a unique negative
factor, even in the high inconsistency condition, as they did in Elliot and Devine’s study.
Instead, in the present dataset, results suggested only a single “negative” factor that
included a variety of negative affect items including those in the dissonance thermometer,
as well as affect items such as “guilty”, “ashamed” and “distressed”. These results
suggest that perhaps the dissonance state is characterized by general negative affect,
rather than the highly specific items identified by Elliot and Devine. Thus, a recharacterization of the dissonance state may be warranted.

4.3

Individual Differences and Dissonance Experience

As predicted, the present results showed support for a negative association between
political conservatism and cognitive dissonance, however there was no evidence for
relationships between dissonance and either religiosity or extraversion under high levels
of inconsistency. The failure of religiosity to relate to dissonance, is particularly
interesting as political conservatism and religiosity have been anecdotally related, though
it should be noted that a highly religious person is not necessarily the same as a highly
conservative religious person (however they may be assumed to overlap; Lee et. al,
2018).
Interestingly, some of the earliest dissonance research also included a case study on
belief-disconfirmation that involved a highly religious sect (Festinger et. al, 1956). That
study suggested that religiosity might reduce the experience of dissonance as it
documented lower levels of belief change in the face of disconfirming evidence.
Additionally, recent evidence supports the idea that salience of religious concepts can
diminish dissonance-reduction in some paradigms (Forstmann & Sagioglou, 2020).
However, given the present results, it may be that alternate processes, rather than
dissonance experience are at play in past findings.
This work suggests that religiosity is not irrelevant to the dissonance equation, but
exactly how it factors in remains to be seen. As robust as the dissonance literature is, only
a few studies deeply explore the implications of individual differences such as these on
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dissonance experience, focusing mainly on higher level group differences (e.g.,
collectivist vs individualistic cultures; Hoshina-Browne et. al, 2005). It is clear that more
research is needed and even more careful conclusions should be drawn.

4.4

Limitations

The above findings present some interesting challenges to dissonance theory, however
there are several limitations to be considered. The first is that while I manipulated beliefbehaviour inconsistency over three levels of inconsistency (vs. no variance in
magnitude), dissonance could have been affected by the specific task itself. In the current
study, participants were asked to write a counter-attitudinal paragraph arguing in favour
of something they reported strongly disbelieving. Having to form an argument in favour
of a highly disbelieved idea may trigger dissonance to a lesser extent than having to argue
persuasively against an idea in which belief is very strong. The addition of such a
condition would significantly enhance the present methodology.
Second, only a single aspect of inconsistency was manipulated in this study: its
magnitude. Specifically, magnitude that concerns belief. Aspects such as non-belief
related magnitude (e.g., exposure to colour-reversed playing cards; Vaidis & Bran, 2021)
or salience of an inconsistency (Brehm & Wicklund, 1970) may alter the experience of
dissonance affect in a similar design and may show effects that might more closely mirror
those previously reported.
Lastly, previous counter-attitudinal tasks often ask participants (in many cases
undergraduate students) to argue persuasively about more personally relevant and
perhaps emotionally polarizing topics, such as university tuition increases (Harmon-Jones
et al., 2008), race relations (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994), or animal rights (CancinoMontecinos et al., 2018). Anecdotal data from debriefing questions revealed that some
topics rated were more uncomfortable and provoked more negative emotion in the
writing process than others. This perhaps indicates that dissonance is only sensitive when
the nature or content of the inconsistency is sufficiently inflammatory.
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4.5

Future Directions

Dissonance research has found practical applications in health interventions (Freijy, T., &
Kothe, E. J., 2013), encouragement of pro-social and values-consistent behaviour (Stone
et. al, 1994), and cross-cultural bridgebuilding (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994). The findings
within this study deepen the current knowledge of the nature of cognitive dissonance,
allowing for a more well-rounded understanding of how to apply this theory to real-world
problems.
Considering the limitations described above, future research should aim to continue to
fine-tune the measurement of cognitive dissonance, using the self-report dissonance
thermometer as a reference point combined with physiological and implicit measures.
Subsequent work must also strive to investigate of various dimensions of beliefbehaviour inconsistency beyond mere magnitude to establish a variety of dissonance
induction procedures that may be standardized according to individual or population
differences.
Finally, future studies using counter-attitudinal tasks should account for both the personal
importance and provocativeness of the content, as indifference towards a topic may
interfere with dissonance effects.
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusions

Although cognitive dissonance theory has been well established in social psychology and
numerous other fields of study, together, these findings clearly highlight the need for
further work on the topic. The current results corroborate certain aspects of the original
theory (e.g., higher dissonance after exposure to high inconsistency vs low or no
inconsistency) and introduce an improved measurement process, but raise further
questions about others (Does inconsistency alone trigger cognitive dissonance affect?
What specific emotions characterize dissonance experience? Does the experience of
dissonance necessarily trigger belief/behaviour change?). Ultimately, there are still
significant gaps in how dissonance is understood, which must be investigated and wellestablished before it should be applied outside of the lab.
On the surface, cognitive dissonance is a neatly packaged and straightforward idea that
serves as an explanation for unexpected changes in behaviour and attitudes. However,
even with hundreds of thousands of publications on the topic, dissonance theory has not
proven to be immune to the issues prevalent in psychology. While some of these studies
(many of them early on in dissonance history) have challenged some of the claims and
conclusions this theory boldly asserts, most of the subsequent work on dissonance uses
the theory as a springboard for application in other domains rather than conducting a
thorough re-examination of the theory itself.
Many initial assumptions of the theory have remained untested, and by revisiting the
basics of cognitive dissonance, this study serves as a single building block in a
foundation of solid psychological research.
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